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U.S. Elite and Public Views on Anti-Terrorist 
Military Action: Are Women Less Militaristic? 
Gwen Moore & Scott Dolan  
Abstract: »Die Bewertung anti-terroristischer Militäraktionen durch Eliten 
und Bevölkerung in den USA: Sind Frauen weniger militaristisch?« Increasing 
numbers of U.S. women in elite positions lead us to ask if women and men 
share the same anti-terrorist policy attitudes, or whether elite (and non-elite) 
women are less militaristic. Using data from four surveys of elites and masses 
from 1986 to 2004, we examine men’s and women’s attitudes towards the use 
of three types of force against terrorists and how these have changed over time. 
Elite and non-elite women are typically less supportive than their men counter-
parts of military action against terrorists, but after the September 11, 200l at-
tacks the gender gap decreased and large majorities favoured such action. 
Among elites, but not the public, gender differences diminish among those 
with similar demographic and political positions. With negligible gender dif-
ferences among similarly placed elites, and high levels of militarism among the 
masses, we conclude that U.S. elites have broad latitude in setting anti-terrorist 
policies. 
Keywords: elites, gender, militarism, terrorism. 
Introduction 
The world looked on with anticipation while a wave of mass uprisings swept 
across North Africa and the Middle East in the first few months of 2011. One 
by one, the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain took to 
the streets to protest against what they considered to be repressive and tyranni-
cal regimes. This series of events, known as the Arab Spring, was marked by 
strikes, demonstrations, and civil uprisings throughout the region, though their 
effects varied. In Libya, a nationwide revolt against the 42-year rule of Muam-
mar Gaddafi emerged in its second-largest city, Benghazi, after peaceful dem-
onstrations against the 1996 massacre of 1,200 prisoners from the Abu Salim 
prison turned into violent conflicts between the protesters and the Gaddafi-
backed police and military. After rebels successfully took control of Benghazi, 
Gaddafi swore to fight back “to the last drop of blood,” and even suggested his 
willingness to be a martyr for the cause. Over the ensuing weeks, increased 
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violent clashes between Gaddafi sympathizers and those seeking to oust Gad-
dafi prompted the international community to respond as the Gaddafi-led air 
strikes and artillery fire threatened to crush the heavily outgunned rebel forces.  
In the United States, questions about whether to intervene in Libya became a 
key concern to the Obama administration. It was the first time that President 
Obama faced a foreign crisis potentially requiring military intervention. In a 
speech delivered to a national audience on March 28th, President Obama laid 
out a foreign policy describing his administration’s philosophy for dealing with 
the looming conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East and more specifi-
cally in Libya. Responding to critics, the President justified the decision of the 
United States to intervene militarily as an answer to the calls of the threatened 
people of Libya, and couched U.S. involvement in air strikes as the need to 
protect the United States’ national security interests. The speech, which some 
pundits referred to as the ‘Obama Doctrine,’ clearly demonstrated the willing-
ness of the Obama administration to use military force. But public reactions to 
the role and involvement U.S. military in the Libyan rebellion were relatively 
mixed. Some questioned whether it was appropriate to use military resources in 
Libya while fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Others saw it as a chance 
for the United States to remove a dictator from the world, and to promote 
American values of democracy.1 
Mixed reactions of the public to foreign policy decisions are not uncommon, 
especially when the use of military force is required. Even the May 2nd assas-
sination of Osama bin Laden following a ‘kill-or-capture’ raid of bin Laden’s 
compound elicited ambiguous public approval, despite widespread public ani-
mosity toward bin Laden. While media coverage shortly after President 
Obama’s announcement of bin Laden’s death showed many people taking to 
the streets in celebration, others questioned whether the killing bin of Laden 
was the appropriate use of force, or whether it was more important to take bin 
Laden alive so that he could stand trial. Overall, however, a large majority of 
the public supported the assassination when asked soon after it occurred.  
In fact, some scholars argue the public is often unclear where it stands on 
foreign policy issues, and relies mostly on elite policymakers for their cues and 
information regarding the use of military force. So while there are sometimes 
disagreements between elite policymakers and the public, survey evidence 
indicates that public opinion tends to follow elite policymaking. For example, 
public opinion surveys on attitudes toward the Iraq War, found that 61 per cent 
approved of an Iraq War just before it began, 77 per cent approved soon after 
the war began, though approval fell as the war continued.2 
                                                             
1  As of the writing of this paper, the questions about whether the United States should have 
intervened continue, even as the rebels neared the complete removal of Gaddafi from 
power, thereby proving the success of the U.S. involvement, by most accounts. 
2  <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq16.htm>; Eichenberg 2005: Table 7. 
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Despite taking their cues from elite policymakers, threats to national secu-
rity, the increased fear of terrorist attacks, and U.S. involvement in two long 
wars in the first decade of the twenty-first century – resulting in thousands of 
deaths of members of the American military, as well as countless deaths of 
soldiers and civilians from Iraq and Afghanistan – has made the U.S. public 
more aware of foreign policy issues and decisions. 
The Work of John Higley and  
Collaborators as a Framework 
The framework used in this paper owes tribute to the work of John Higley. 
Over the past few decades, Higley has worked tirelessly to point out the inevi-
tability of political elites, where political elites are defined as “persons who are 
able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and move-
ments, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Higley and 
Burton 2006: 7). Because strategic positions within powerful organizations and 
movements are scarce, elites have the power and authority to make decisions of 
consequence that the numerical majority of people in society lack. Drawing 
from this classical elite tradition, Higley has always put emphasis on the kinds 
of people who can exert influence over the political sphere. Or as Higley and 
his co-authors often state, elites are people who have the ability to make “real 
trouble” (e.g., Higley and Moore 2000: 175). 
This is no different with regards to foreign policy. From the perspective of 
elite theorists like Higley, the central focus should be on those people in posi-
tions of power who have the organized capacity to make real and continuing 
trouble. But to say that elites should be the unit of analysis does not mean that 
non-elites are powerless. Rather it means that elites are more important because 
they have positions within organizations giving them the capacity to influence 
foreign policy decisions in ways that the masses cannot. The focus of this arti-
cle then, drawing from an elite theoretical tradition, becomes how congruent 
are public opinion to elite opinions and policymaking, especially when it comes 
to foreign policy. So while elites are the key variable, the elite tradition recog-
nizes that political elites are constrained by non-elites, and at the very least are 
partially dependent upon non-elite support. Thus, when it comes to foreign 
policy – and military intervention more specifically – elites must couch their 
decisions and policies in a way that elicits support from the masses (Higley and 
Burton 2006). Or at least they must make decisions that do not create too much 
discontent from the masses. They must “frame their appeals to accord with the 
interests and political orientations of non-elites” (Higley and Burton 2006: 27). 
In this way, non-elites set the broad parameters within which elites are able to 
make decisions. 
Little research has compared public opinion to elite opinion (for exceptions 
see Page and Bouton 2006; Holsti 2004). Thus very little is known about the 
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degree to which elite attitudes towards the use of the military force operate 
within the boundaries set by the masses. More is known about public attitudes 
than about the degree to which elites and non-elites agree on militant foreign 
policy. At the same time, there is very little research about the extent of agree-
ment within and across elite groups. Questions remain about whether attitudes 
of elites in government positions are similar to elites in private and voluntary 
sectors. With increasing numbers of women in elite positions, there are also 
questions about whether women and men share the same foreign policy atti-
tudes, or whether elite (and non-elite) women are less militaristic than their 
male counterparts, as some have argued. Such questions can get at issues of 
value consensus among elites as well as the coincidence of interests between 
elites and masses with regard to military intervention and the use of force. 
Elite and Mass Attitudes Toward Use of Military Force 
A set of quadrennial surveys of leaders’ and public attitudes conducted by the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) from 1975 to 2004 has pro-
vided data for most comparisons of elite and mass attitudes toward the use of 
military force (e.g., Holsti 2004; Page and Bouton 2006) and we use CCFR 
data here, as described below.  
Scholars studying public and/or elite attitudes toward U.S. relations with 
other countries often distinguish between those holding isolationist views and 
those favouring a more internationalist foreign policy. Internationalists are 
typically divided between those favouring cooperative international relations 
(CI) and those tending toward more militant internationalism (MI) and indicate 
support for sending U.S. troops abroad under various scenarios, defending 
allies and supplying military aid to other countries (e.g., Wittkopf 1990; 
Chanley 1999; Holsti 2004). Elites are more internationalist than the masses 
(Oldendick and Bardes 1982; Holsti 2004).  
Approval of foreign military involvement among the public was at a low 
point near the end of the Vietnam War (Page and Bouton 2006). But this disap-
proval was short-lived; approval of deploying troops abroad for various hypo-
thetical events, such as if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, began a gradual increase 
soon after. As did the U.S.’s military involvement abroad. 
A study of elite attitudes toward militancy in foreign policy, based on CCFR 
studies, found that U.S. elites had not become more militaristic only recently 
(e.g., as argued by Bob Herbert in a New York Times column on May 30, 
2005), but that the trend toward support of the use of military force had been 
clear at least since the mid-1970s, soon after the end of the Vietnam War 
(Moore and Mack 2007). Political elites were somewhat more militaristic than 
those in non-political elite positions (e.g., journalists, business leaders, schol-
ars, union leaders, religious leaders) and Republican politicians were more 
favourable toward militant action abroad, but the gaps between occupations 
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and parties were generally small (Moore and Mack 2007). Elite and public 
support for the ‘war on terror’ has been strong since the September 11, 2001 
attacks in the U.S. (Moore and Mack 2007). Indeed, Bacevich (2010, 22-3; also 
see 14-5) argues that U.S. elites have long held a worldview in which “… U.S. 
military power, the Pentagon’s global footprint, and an American penchant for 
intervention … are normal, even laudable.” At the same time, he contends that 
the American public takes this for granted, writing “The citizens of the United 
States have essentially forfeited any capacity to ask first-order questions about 
the fundamentals of national security policy.” (Bacevich, 2010, 27).  
In historical perspective, Holsti (2004, 116) states that deploying troops 
abroad has been contentious ever since the War of 1812. Elites have consis-
tently offered far higher levels of approval than the general public in using U.S. 
troops abroad under various hypothetical scenarios, such as if Soviet/Russian 
troops invaded Western Europe or Iraq involved Saudi Arabia (Holsti 2004, 
Table 4.4; Page and Bouton 2006). Some evidence indicates that public support 
for deploying troops abroad diminishes if casualties are mentioned in the ques-
tion (e.g., Holsti 2004, 121-4) and increases for successful wars (Eichenberg 
2005). The elite-public gap is not constant in size, shrinking, for example, after 
the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001 (Page and Bouton 2006, 214).  
Social Factors in Attitudes Toward Military Force 
Page and Bouton (2006) find that public views on the use of military force 
differ by individuals’ personal and social characteristics. With data from the 
2002 CCFR, they found that men, whites, the more educated and those with 
higher incomes more often favour the use of military force than did others 
(Page and Bouton 2006, 121-22). Most of these relationships, however, lose 
their impact in multiple regression analyses; i.e., they do not have statistically 
significant effects when personal and social characteristics are examined 
jointly. Gender, religion, and to a lesser extent, education, do have independent 
effects on attitudes toward the use of military force (Page and Bouton 2006, 
122). But more important than demographic characteristics are “purposive 
belief systems,” including party identification, ideology and internationalism 
(Page and Bouton 2006, 122). 
Gender and Attitudes Toward Military Force 
We focus on women’s and men’s attitudes toward the use of military force 
against terrorists and how these have changed over time, especially before and 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Most re-
search finds that women are less favourable toward military force both in the 
general public (e.g., Conover and Sapiro 1993; Page and Bouton 2006) and 
among elites (Holsti and Rosenau 1995). 
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Based on four surveys between 1976 and 1988, Holsti and Rosenau (1995) 
conclude that gender has far less power than party or ideology in explaining 
elites’ attitudes toward militancy (MI) or cooperation (CI) in foreign relations. 
They do report that women but not men moved more toward favouring coop-
erative relations during that period (Holsti and Rosenau 1995, 122). In addition, 
they conclude that women are less likely than men to support the use of mili-
tary power abroad throughout the period studied (Holsti and Rosenau 1995).  
Analyzing a large number of public opinion surveys on use of military force 
by the U.S. in ten episodes between 1990 and 2002, Eichenberg (2003, Table 
2) finds that women were less favourable than men for each episode, including 
the war against terror and the Iraq War. There is a similar gender gap when 
specific types of military action (e.g., bombing, troops, arms) are mentioned 
(Eichenberg 2003, Table 3). Nevertheless, the majority of women studied ap-
proved of the use of military force in the war against terror, the Iraq War, and 
in Sudan and Somalia. In a later paper looking at gender differences in support 
for the use of military force in 37 countries, Eichenberg (2007) found consis-
tent gender gaps, with women less supportive across six historical conflicts (the 
Gulf War, weapons inspection in Iraq, NATO’s intervention in Bosnia, 
NATO’s attack against Serbia to support the Kosovar Albanians, Afghanistan 
War, Iraq War), with Oman the single exception.  
With CCFR data for both elites and masses, we identify any gender gap in 
elites and/or masses as well as between elite and public women and elite and 
public men. Over the past several decades women’s educational attainment and 
movement into elite positions in the United States and elsewhere, both in and 
outside of government, have grown. Uncovering the extent of gender similari-
ties and differences in foreign policy attitudes will yield evidence for the debate 
over whether women’s attitudes are shaped more by their position (elite/non-
elite) or their gender. Results will also offer evidence to judge the contention 
that if more women were in positions of power, states would undertake a more 
cooperative approach to foreign policy. To address these arguments, we ask 
whether elite women’s views toward the use of military force against terrorists 
are more similar to those of elite men (the positional argument) or to those of 
non-elite women (the gender argument).  
Multivariate analyses measure the effect of gender on public and elite atti-
tudes toward the use of military force against terrorists, net of other variables 
that previous research indicates are related to those attitudes, such as demo-
graphic characteristics, political party and ideology. Also, identical models for 
elites and non-elites allow us to compare the net effects of these variables for 
the two groups. 
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We seek answers to these research questions: Are elite (and non-elite)3 men 
more in favour of military action against terrorists than are similarly situated 
women? Are gender differences consistent across specific questions and/or 
across time? Are gender differences larger among the public than among elites? 
Are elite women’s attitudes more similar to those of elite men or to those of 
non-elite women? Do the same social and political factors affect elites’ and 
non-elites’ views on the use of military force against terrorists? 
The Data  
The longitudinal survey “American Public Opinion and United States Foreign 
Policy” was conducted approximately every four years from 1975 to 2004 to  
investigate the opinions and attitudes of the general public and a select group 
of opinion leaders (or elites) on matters relating to United States foreign poli-
cy. For purposes of this series, opinion leaders are defined as individuals in 
positions of leadership in government, academia, business and labour, the me-
dia, religious institutions, special interest groups, and private foreign policy 
organizations” (CCFR 2005; ICPSR 2005).4 
Elite interviews were conducted in person or by telephone, depending on the 
year. Individual survey years have a total of 330-450 elite interviews in the 
above groups. The number of persons interviewed varies from one sector to 
another, with a far larger number of media leaders in most studies. For this 
reason, we have weighted the data to give equal weight to each of the elite 
groups.  
The CCFR studies also included large, representative sample of members of 
the general public, with total numbers varying across the years from a low of 
1,038 in 2002 to a high of 1,418 in 1986. Interviews were conducted in person 
and by telephone.  
In this paper we use responses to questions on favoured responses to terror-
ism for 1986, 1998, 2002 and 20045 from the following three-part question: 
                                                             
3  Previous research has shown that non-elite men are more favourable toward the use of force 
against terrorism than are their women counterparts (Holsti 2004). 
4  Groups comprising the elite samples vary only slightly across the years. In each leadership 
group top positions whose incumbents would have knowledge of international affairs were 
identified. In the Senate and House of Representatives these are members of the Foreign 
Affairs and Armed Services Committees. If the Senator or Representative was unavailable, 
a top foreign policy aide was interviewed. In the Administration they are assistant secretar-
ies in State, Defence, Treasury and other related departments. Also included are: chairmen 
and vice presidents of large corporations and heads of business associations; heads of major 
labour unions, editors, broadcasters and publishers of print and broadcast media; presidents 
and scholars from major universities; leaders from private foreign policy institutes, reli-
gious organizations, volunteer organizations and various ethnic organizations (CCFR 2005; 
Moore and Mack 2007). 
5  In 1986 and earlier studies the small number of elite women in the surveys precludes as-
sessment of elite gender differences. 
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In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favour or 
oppose each of the following measures.  
- First, How about […] U.S. air strikes against terrorist training camps and 
other facilities […] 
- Attacks by U.S. ground troops against terrorist training camps and other 
facilities […] 
- Assassination of individual terrorist leaders. 
The questions on military responses to terrorism were not asked before 1998, 
with the exception of the question on assassination of terrorists that was asked 
beginning in 1986. Some later studies are omitted because they did not record 
elites’ gender. T-tests compare responses for women and men among elites and 
in the general public samples to the three questions on favoured responses to 
terrorism. Percentage differences are also calculated for various subgroups by 
gender and year.  
Finally, multivariate analyses assess the statistical significance of gender, 
demographic and social factors, net of one another, in the public and elite sur-
veys for each of the three terrorism scenarios. These variables are gender, year 
of survey, age and age squared, race, education, political party, and political 
ideology. For elites race and education are omitted because they are not meas-
ured in all surveys, and a variable indicating whether respondent is in a politi-
cal (government) or non-political position is added. 
Results 
Figure 1 shows public and elite attitudes towards using the U.S. air force to 
attack terrorist facilities in 1998, 2002 and 2004. It shows a small gap between 
public and elite attitudes in each year, with a sharp rise in approval between 
1998 and 2002, followed by a small decline in 2004, three years after the 9/11 
attacks. In all years, a large majority of respondents favoured air attacks on 
terrorist facilities. 
The similarity between elites and the public in Figure 1 declines when the 
two groups are divided by gender (Figure 2). In 1998 women elites and non-
elites favoured air attacks less than comparable men. In 2002, there is consider-
able agreement among all groups in favour of air attacks on terrorist facilities. 
But this agreement did not last. By 2004 all groups still overwhelmingly fa-
voured air attacks, but women’s approval had declined. This pattern over time 
is similar for attitudes toward deploying ground troops to attack terrorist facili-
ties, as is shown in Figures 3 and 4.  
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Figure 1: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward  
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Figure 2: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward 
U.S. Air Force Attack on Terrorist Facilities by Gender 
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Figures 3 and 4 again illustrate the importance of introducing gender in our 
analyses. Members of the public and elites exhibited similar majorities in fa-
vour of using ground troops to attack terrorist facilities, except in 2002 when 
members of the public favoured this action at a higher level than did elites 
(Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward  
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Figure 4: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward  
U.S. Ground Attack on Terrorist Facilities by Gender 
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A similar sized majority of men and women among elites and non-elites fa-
voured use of ground troops in 1998 (Figure 4). Far larger majorities of all four 
groups approved of the use of ground troops in 2002, soon after the September 
11th terrorist attacks, with women and men in the public indicating the highest 
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rates of approval. But elites’ attitudes diverged in 2004: elite men’s approval 
increased while other groups remained roughly stable. 
Figure 5: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward Assassination of Terrorists 
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Figure 6: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward  
Assassination of Terrorists by Gender 
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Members of the public expressed far higher levels of approval than did elites 
for assassinating individual terrorists in all four years shown in Figure 5. Figure 
6 shows that both women and men among the public favoured assassination of 
terrorist leaders far more than did their elite counterparts. Before 2001, a mi-
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nority of elites approved of assassination of individual terrorists, compared to 
2002 and 2004 when majorities of all groups except elite women approved of 
this potential action. Compared to 2002, in 2004 more elite and public men, but 
fewer comparable women, voiced approval of assassination of individual ter-
rorists. 
Results in Figures 1-6 demonstrate that attitudes toward possible military 
action against terrorists vary by specific hypothetical action (lowest levels of 
approval are for assassinations), between elites and the public (with the largest 
gap on attitudes toward assassination), by year (with approval of all three hypo-
thetical actions rising precipitously after September 11th), and by gender (with 
men generally more favourable toward anti-terrorist military actions than 
women).  
Analyses so far have not included demographic and political factors that 
some research has found to be important in attitudes toward military action 
abroad (e. g., Holsti 2004; Page and Bouton 2006). Tables 1 and 2 show three 
logistic regression models for the public and elites, respectively. The first 
model shows the impact of gender on approval or disapproval of each of the 
three hypothetical military actions, the second model adds all variables avail-
able in both elite and public samples, but the third model differs, adding a 
variable indicating political or non-political position for elites, and including 
race and education for the public. The first two models, thus, are identical for 
elites and the public, while the third model adds variables that are measured for 
one group but not the other. 
Men in the general public were significantly more likely than public women 
to approve of the three hypothetical military actions in each model in Table 1. 
In the second model, years of education is negatively related to approval of 
military actions, as has been found in related research (e.g., Holsti 2004; Page 
and Bouton 2006). Republicans were more positive toward military actions, 
while liberals were more negative. Also consistent with other research, whites 
were more favourable toward these military actions than were others (Page and 
Bouton 2006). In sum, gender, race, education, Republican party identification 
and liberal ideology are statistically significant in the public sample, net of 
other variables, in these models measuring attitudes toward anti-terrorist mili-
tary actions.  
Turning to elites’ opinions shows some differences from the general public 
(Table 2). Elite men were more favourable toward U.S. air force attacks on 
terrorist camps in all three models. But gender is not statistically significant for 
using ground troops against terrorists, nor is it significant in the multivariate 
models for approval of assassinating individual terrorists. Gender has a more 
consistent effect among the general public than among elites. 
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More important than gender for elites are political party and political ideology. 
Liberals were significantly less likely than others to approve of the three hypo-
thetical military actions against terrorists. Political party was also statistically 
significant, with both Republicans and Democrats more likely than others (the 
omitted category is independents) to approve of the military actions. In Model 
3, a variable indicates whether the person is in a political position or not. Politi-
cians approved of using the air force to strike terrorist training camps more 
than their non-political counterparts, but the impact of this variable for using 
ground troops or assassinating individual terrorists is small and not statistically 
significant.  
Among both elites and the general public political party and political ideol-
ogy are strongly related to attitudes toward militant action against terrorists. 
Race and education are generally related to those attitudes among the public, 
but since these variables were not reported for elites, we cannot compare their 
effect for elites. Age has little effect for elites and the general public, while the 
year of the study does, even with other variables in the model, as we saw in 
Figures 1-6. 
Discussion  
The analyses have shown that elite and non-elite men are generally more fa-
vourable toward military action against terrorists than are their women coun-
terparts. Among the public sample, this gender difference is consistent for each 
of the three anti-terrorism measures in all time periods studied. Women elites 
are less approving than their men counterparts of the three potential actions in 
most cases, though gender differences are small or absent in three instances: 
attitudes toward the use of ground troops in 1998 and 2002 and air attacks in 
2002.  
The public-elite gap, with the public more favourable toward air force at-
tacks and/or ground troop attacks against terrorist facilities, is small and statis-
tically significant in only one of six comparisons (ground troops in 2002). The 
pattern over time is consistent: increases in approval in 2002, compared to 
1998, and a slight decline in 2004. The one exception is elite men whose ap-
proval showed a small increase from 2002 to 2004.  
Approval of the assassination of individual terrorists generally reveals the 
largest gap between the public and elites, with the public approving at a far 
higher rate. Nearly 60 percent of the public but only 35 percent of elites ap-
proved of such action in 1998 before major terrorist attacks by foreigners on 
the U.S. Both groups increased approval rates in 2002 and again in 2004. Elite 
women stand out from the other three categories in never rising above half 
approving of such action.  
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The gap in attitudes toward assassinating an individual terrorist between 
men in the public and in elites, as well as women in each group, is large each 
year. But the percent difference between elite men and women is small.  
The trend line of attitudes is consistent with related terrorist and military 
events. No large terrorist attacks in the U.S. (other than the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1993) had recently occurred in 1986 and 1998. The 2002 studies 
followed soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the begin-
ning of U.S. military action in Afghanistan later that year, while the 2004 data 
were collected about a year after the Iraq War began. Declines in approval of 
anti-terrorist activities in 2004 might reflect increasing recognition among the 
public and elites of the realities of the costs of that War. As noted previously, 
77 percent of those polled in the month after the Iraq War began thought the 
war was worth fighting but that percentage had declined more than twenty 
points a year later (ABC News/Washington Post Polls as reported in.6  
Previous research has found that American elites are more internationalist 
than are non-elites. Yet our examination of attitudes toward the use of military 
force against terrorists (militant internationalism) indicates that members of the 
public are at least as or more approving of three possible military actions than 
are elites (also see Page and Bouton 2006, 214). Overall, though, both groups 
are increasingly favourable toward these anti-terrorist actions over time, with a 
slight decline for most in 2004. In general, women in both groups, especially in 
the general public, are somewhat less favourable toward these militant actions 
than are like men. When comparing women and men who are similar in social 
and ideological factors, elite women differ little from their men counterparts on 
these attitudes. Non-elite women, in contrast, remain less favourable toward the 
three potential anti-terrorist actions than are like men.  
Conclusion 
These results offer some support for the view that women differ from men in 
support for military violence, suggesting that if there were more women in elite 
positions, militaristic foreign policy in the U.S. would decline. Both elite and 
public women are less favourable toward the hypothetical antiterrorist actions 
than are their men counterparts. On the other hand, in the multivariate analyses 
(controlling for social and ideological variables), elite men and women differ 
far less. Thus the large gender gap among non-elites is reduced considerably 
among elites suggesting that women who achieve elite positions are, or be-
come, similar to their men counterparts. While not conclusive, our results offer 
more support for the positional argument (occupation matters more) than for 
the gender argument (gender matters more). Indeed, actions of women political 
                                                             
6  <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq3.htm> (accessed August 20, 2011). 
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leaders, such as Margaret Thatcher in the UK, are often as militaristic as those 
of the men preceding and following them in office. Another example is the 
2008 U.S. presidential primaries where Hillary Clinton’s election platform 
supported the continuation of the U.S.’s militaristic foreign policy more 
strongly than the platforms of her chief (men) opponents. Some argued that 
Clinton had to show that she was ‘up to the job’ of war making since women 
are often seen as ‘soft.’ 
Elite and non-elite women are typically less supportive than their men coun-
terparts of military action against terrorists, but after September 11, 2001 ma-
jorities of women in both groups voiced support for the use of air raids and 
ground troops against terrorist training facilities, and most non-elite women 
also favoured assassination of individual terrorists. Some authors (e.g., Kanter 
1976) have argued that women and other minorities gain more power when 
they are a large proportion of a group. With the great majority of elite positions 
in the U.S. occupied by men, we do not know if elite women would offer less 
support for militant anti-terrorist actions if they held a majority or a large mi-
nority of such positions.  
Unfortunately CCFR data have not been collected since 2004 to allow study 
of more recent trends in elite and public attitudes on anti-terrorist actions. Still, 
polling data on the U.S. public’s attitudes toward anti-terrorist actions and the 
Iraq and Afghan wars are widely available. The public’s approval of militant 
action against terrorists continues; as does the tendency of the public’s opinions 
to follow elite actions. For instance, in 2009 a Pew survey found that sixty 
percent of those interviewed approved of “the CIA having a program that tar-
gets al Qaeda leaders for assassination.” A poll just under two years later just 
after the assassination of Osama bin Laden reported that nearly eighty percent 
of the public approved.7 The findings in this paper, however, suggest support 
for the use of military force against terrorists is partially contingent on the time 
period, especially the political climate and environment. Public support for 
military intervention increased as the threat of terrorism became more immi-
nent to the public – following the September 11th attacks. Though as those 
attacks became more distant, support for the use of military force declined.  
The findings also indicate that political party and ideology impact attitudes 
toward anti-terrorist policy among elites and the general public. The consistent 
gap between Republicans and Democrats, as well as liberals and conservatives, 
does not necessarily indicate a fragmented elite or public. Elite theorists as-
sume that consensual elites must agree on broad principles and values, not 
necessarily specific policies. Such differences, however, could explain the 
differences among elites and between elites and non-elites towards the use of 
military force. Particularly, we suggest that future research take into account 
                                                             
7  <http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2011/05/11/6626397-ap-gfk-poll-bin-laden-killing-was-
justified>. 
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the political orientation and political party affiliation of elite women in order to 
assess whether the similarities/differences between elite men and women are 
due primarily to differences in political ideology.  
Ultimately, if it is elite theorists’ contention that non-elites set the parame-
ters for elite action, those parameters are very broad in relation to U.S. anti-
terrorist policies and actions. As can be seen in this paper, the public in many 
cases is more supportive than elites of military action against terrorists and 
approval of such actions rises after military action. This suggests that U.S. 
elites have little difficulty gaining public support for anti-terrorist actions. Such 
findings suggest that we can expect elites in the United States to have contin-
ued widespread support for military intervention against terrorists. Despite the 
broad parameters set by the public, it is important to note that elites on the 
whole are more likely than the public to be moderate in their views towards the 
use of military force. At the very least, this suggests that elites can be expected 
to be more discerning when it comes to the use of military force.  
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